A regional perspective on the credit view by Katherine A. Samolyk
A Regional Perspective
on the Credit View
by Katherine A. Samolyk Katherine A. Samolyk is an econo-
mist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. The author gratefully
acknowledges helpful comments
and suggestions from Ben Ber-
nanke, Randall Eberts, William





Although the last decade ushered in the longest
peacetime expansion of the modern era, it also
saw a precipitous rise in the number of bank
failures. More than half of the banks that have
been declared insolvent since the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation was founded in 1933
failed during the 1980s. Given the current trend
toward deregulation, the structure of the finan-
cial services industry has come under intense
scrutiny. More recently, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem has been concerned about how the poor
health of the banking industry may be affecting
the supply of credit and thereby depressing eco-
nomic activity.
Concerns about a credit crunch are paralleled
by macroeconomists' increasing interest in un-
derstanding the relationship between the finan-
cial sector and the real sector. The notion that
credit-market activity may affect real economic
activity has come to be known as the credit view.
According to this view, credit markets are impor-
tant in determining the allocation of resources in
an economy for two simple reasons. First, indi-
viduals with profitable investment projects may
not have the financial resources to fund their
ventures themselves. Investors with financial
capital do not have complete information about
these investment projects and face costs asso-
ciated with monitoring their performance. Con-
sequently, investors will impose more stringent
credit terms, such as higher interest rates or
higher collateral requirements, on less credit-
worthy borrowers to compensate for expected
monitoring costs.
Second, this view also posits that financial
intermediaries (hereafter referred to as banks)
improve the efficiency of credit markets by iden-
tifying, funding, and monitoring the perform-
ance of profitable investment projects. However,
much of the information produced by banks is
confidential, so they must be monitored as well.
This implies that the ability to fund risky ven-
tures is affected by the creditworthiness of
banks, as measured by the financial health of
their balance sheets. Because a less creditwor-
thy bank is more likely to require monitoring,
depositors will (and regulators should) impose
more stringent credit requirements on the insti-
tution. Thus, the credit view posits that financial
factors, such as the health of bank balance
sheets, can affect the allocation of resources
and the level of real economic activity.
The credit view may have important implica-
tions for nations that are characterized byFIGURE 1
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diverse regional economies, such as the United
States. When it is more costly to monitor the per-
formance of risky ventures in regions outside
the local sphere, credit markets may segment
along regional dimensions. Thus, because local
banks play an important role in funding local
borrowers, the health of a region's banking sec-
tor may affect its ability to intermediate credit to
local projects. In addition, features of state and
federal financial regulatory systems, such as
interstate banking restrictions, tend to magnify
the effect of factors that impede the inter-
regional flow of funds.
The regional dimensions of credit flows may
be important in assessing the performance of
regional economies. Credit markets may be a
channel by which regional economic conditions
can be propagated into the future. This credit
view suggests that regional recessions may be
prolonged because of the effect of poor eco-
nomic performance on the creditworthiness of
both local banks and nonbank borrowers and,
hence, on the region's ability to attract the exter-
nal finance needed to fund local investment
activity. For example, capital-poor Boston banks
may be unable to lend to a profitable-but-risky
local biotechnology firm, while healthy Cleve-
land banks may choose not to invest in it
because monitoring the firm is too costly. In the
extreme case, the venture is not undertaken at
all. Instead, resources in Cleveland are chan-
neled to local investment projects with lower
real returns — albeit projects with lower informa-
tion costs.
Regional disparities in economic performance
have been stark in recent years. Figure 1 depicts
the difference between the growth rate of real
gross state product (GSP) and the growth rate of
real gross national product (GNP) for nine
regions from 1980 to 1986. Likewise, credit
problems, especially those impacting on the
banking industry, have also varied considerably
across regions. Failures of depository institutions
have been concentrated in economically dis-
tressed areas. The most stark examples are the
depressed farm belt and oil-producing regions
in the mid-1980s, and more recently the North-
east. The credit view suggests that financial
problems associated with regional recessions
may make it more difficult for these areas to
fund a recovery.
Despite the sharp disparities in regional eco-
nomic conditions, most empirical studies have
looked for a link between credit and economic
activity at the national level. A significant credit
channel at the regional level, however, may be
obscured in tests that aggregate data across
regions. Specifically, regional information costs
may cause the relationship between financial-
sector conditions and economic activity to be
different for states experiencing economic dif-
ficulties than for those in an economic boom;
thus, a cross-sectional approach may be better
suited to testing for a credit channel in the
United States.
This paper provides a first step in testing for
whether there is a link between regional creditmarkets and regional economic performance.
State-level data between 1980 and 1986 are
used to examine the relationship between state
output growth (relative to national output
growth) and several measures of regional credit
health, including failed business liabilities, com-
mercial bank loan-loss reserves, and the return
on commercial bank equity. A pooled cross-
sectional time-series approach is used to exam-
ine whether the relationship between financial
conditions and economic performance differs
for low-growth versus high-growth states.
The results yield evidence of a regional credit
channel. Regional bank balance-sheet conditions
are significantly related to the performance of
regional economies. Moreover, there is a differ-
ent relationship between credit health and eco-
nomic growth in states experiencing slow output
growth compared with those that are doing well.
I. A Regional
Credit View
The regional credit view presented here ex-
amines the implications of an asymmetric distri-
bution of information among investors and
entrepreneurs for a regional economy.
1 It
assumes that investors with financial capital do
not have good information about entrepreneurs
seeking funding. Thus, the creditworthiness of
these borrowers — as measured by their col-
lateral, the underlying project risks, and the
costs of monitoring their contracts — affects the
terms of credit and subsequently the mix of in-
vestments that are funded.
2 The credit view also
assumes that banks improve the efficiency of
capital markets by reducing the information costs
associated with credit flows. Banks specialize in
identifying and monitoring investment projects.
They also diversify across many projects, thus
reducing the costs that depositors must incur to
monitor bank portfolios (in an unregulated finan-
cial system).
3 However, when banks cannot
completely diversify portfolio risks that are costly
to monitor, the creditworthiness of these institu-
tions— as measured by their equity capital and
• 1 See Gertler (1988) for a review of asymmetric information
models of credit markets.
• 2 The information costs associated with credit risks may even lead
to the credit rationing of borrowers with profitable investment projects
(see Williamson [1986]).
I 3 In the extreme, when a bank can completely diversify individual
credit risks, the amount of the bank's capital and the dispersion of its in-
dividual asset returns do not affect the ability to fund its portfolio (see
Diamond [1984]).
the credit quality of their loan portfolios —
affects their ability to fund risky investments.
4
An important implication of this view is that
changes in bank creditworthiness can affect eco-
nomic activity. Specifically, a deterioration of the
internal wealth of banks (bank equity capital)
can make it more costly for them to fund projects
and thus can depress investment activity.
In a previous paper, Samolyk (1989), I present
a formal model of how imperfect information
can underlie a regional credit channel between
local credit conditions and local investment ac-
tivity. The model emphasizes the role of banks
in funding investments and assumes that banks
possess a specialized information technology
that allows them to identify and monitor invest-
ment projects more efficiently than other individ-
uals in credit markets. Unlike much theoretical
literature that uses imperfect information to moti-
vate financial structure, however, this analysis
assumes that the economy is made up of regional
economies that have different production tech-
nologies. The local production technologies
have a random return, and the distribution of
returns on local investment activity is assumed
to exhibit diminishing marginal returns.
In each productive sector there are two types
of individuals: bankers and lenders. Bankers
possess an information technology for locating
and monitoring specific real investment projects;
lenders do not. Bankers obtain external finance
to fund their portfolios of projects, produce
information in locating and monitoring projects,
and provide lenders with access to additional
investment opportunities. As explained in Ber-
nanke and Gertler (1987), local banks cannot
perfectly diversify portfolio risk because the
scale of an individual bank project is large rela-
tive to the size of a bank's portfolio. Therefore,
the ability of banks to fund local investments is
related to their financial health.
The model also assumes that monitoring
costs are lower for local investments than for
investments in other regions.^ Thus, credit mar-
kets are regional because banks can use their
technology most efficiently in making local
investments. Banks can invest in other regions,
but they face higher monitoring costs in doing
so. These conditions imply that the cost of credit
to local banks depends on their relative credit-
• 4 Bernanke and Gertler (1987) formally model the relationship be-
tween bank creditworthinass and the funding of specialized investment
projects.
• 5 These costs include the cost of monitoring both the ex ante dis-
tribution of investments and the ex post returns to projects undertaken.worthiness as well as on the profitability of their
investment projects.
Since expected monitoring costs rise as lever-
aged investment increases, while expected proj-
ect returns exhibit diminishing marginal returns,
an upper bound exists on the capacity of a
region to fund risky investments externally,
given its stock of internal financial capital.
Regional balance-sheet conditions and the dis-
tribution of investment opportunities are there-
fore related to a region's financial capacity.
In this model, disparities in regional economic
performance can be exacerbated by the impact
of regional economic conditions on the credit-
worthiness of local banks. In areas experiencing
a local recession, the resulting erosion in bank
capital can prevent banks from funding profit-
able, albeit privately monitored, local projects
that would be financed if information were cost-
less. For example, consider an economy com-
prised of regions with independent but identical
production possibilities. If half of the regions
receive a poor investment return while the other
half receive an above-average return, banks in
ailing regions may find it more difficult to attract
external finance to fund profitable new invest-
ment projects, even though banks in other
regions are flush with funds. Thus, poor regional
economic performance can be propagated into
the future as the associated decline in creditwor-
thiness hinders the ability of banks to fund a
recovery. This occurs because poor regional
credit health precludes the use of local informa-
tion about profitable investment opportunities.
Moreover, capital-rich sectors will invest in
lower-yielding local projects as long as the
return is greater than the cost-adjusted return as-
sociated with funding capital-poor regions. As a
result, although national bank capital may not
have changed, disparate regional credit health
can cause the return from investment activity in
the overall economy to be lower.
7 The impact
of regional disparities in bank capital is greater
than the impact of regional differences in other
sources of funds because of banks' comparative
efficiency in producing information about local
• 6 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for a theoretical model in which
credit effects are strongest in distressed economies.
• 7 In Samolyk (1989), I demonstrate how, when there is short-run
immobility in information technology, regional imbalances both in entre-
preneurial wealth and in the distribution of investment opportunities can
affect the aggregate allocation of credit and aggregate future output rela-
tive to the allocation that would be feasible if regional information asym-
metries did not exist.
investments.
8 Thus, this credit view also sug-
gests that a link between credit conditions and
economic activity at the regional level could be







The notion that the financial system propagates
economic fluctuations depends on how finan-
cial structure affects the allocation of resources.
The imperfect-information view of a credit chan-
nel suggests that changes in the costs of supply-
ing credit-market services can affect investment
expenditures and output; thus, financial-sector
performance can feed back to the real sector
and exacerbate output fluctuations. However,
empirical tests for a macroeconomic link be-
tween financial structure and economic activity
have yielded inconclusive evidence of the exis-
tence of such a channel.
9
The mixed evidence of the importance of
financial performance for business fluctuations
in studies using national-level data may reflect
the difficulties inherent in finding proxies for
financial services associated with the informa-
tion costs that underlie the credit view. Tests for
a credit channel to output often use credit flows
and interest-rate measures to proxy for financial
performance. These measures, however, are a
reflection of financial capacity as well as expec-
tations about future economic activity and
hence about the profitability of real investment
opportunities. Expectations about the distribu-
tion of future investment opportunities would
affect credit flows even in a world of perfect in-
formation, where financial structure is irrelevant
to the level and mix of investment activity.
Thus, concluding that these variables help to
predict economic activity does not imply that
they also cause economic activity. For example,
the determination that lower growth in bank
lending tends to precede a decline in economic
activity may merely reflect a decrease in the prof-
itability of investment opportunities (and, hence,
a decrease in loan demand). Likewise, evidence
of an increase in perceived credit risks, in the
• 8 This result generalizes to any firm that produces information in
funding local ventures, including other types of financial intermediaries
as well as local entrepreneurs who have access to direct credit markets.
• 9 See Gertler (1988) for a survey of these studies.form of larger default-risk premiums, is not
unambiguously indicative of financial-market
frictions, because it is difficult to identify
whether the premium is associated with higher
monitoring costs or with a change in the under-
lying distributions of returns on risky real invest-
ment projects.
In a previous paper (Samolyk [1990]), I argue
that it is the higher cost of finance associated
with credit failures and reduced internal capital
for future financing that may "cause" real activity
to the extent that it magnifies output fluctuations.
Debt default, because it reduces the entrepre-
neurial capital of both primary borrowers and
financial intermediaries, may be a relevant chan-
nel by which financial-market performance can
feed back and affect economic activity. I find
that, controlling for monetary conditions and
lagged economic activity, past insolvencies are
significantly related to real output.
1
0
The regional credit view presented here has
implications for empirically testing for a credit
channel. First, because it implies that the alloca-
tion of credit is affected by a region's creditwor-
thiness, it recommends the use of variables
related to the health of regional financial balance
sheets (such as debt in default) as financial prox-
ies. In addition, because a region's relative credit-
worthiness can affect its access to funds, the
regional credit view suggests that there may be
an asymmetric relationship between credit condi-
tions and economic activity for creditworthy
regions versus those that are poor credit risks;
regional credit problems may constrain regional
growth more than healthy credit markets may
stimulate it. Thus, regional credit conditions may
be significantly related to differences in regional
economic performance in a way that would be
obscured in examining data aggregated at the
national level. To the extent that credit markets
may be regional—whether a vestige of regulation
or a feature of optimal industrial organization —
a cross-sectional time-series approach may be




I estimate two types of reduced-form models of
relative state output growth using annual state-
level data from 1979 to 1986 (which span the
• 10 This study is related to Bemanke's (1983) study of the Great
Depression.
• 11 Although this asymmetry implies that regional credit imbalance
could be a drag on aggregate economic growth, this paper tests for a
regional credit channel rather than for whether regional credit imbalances
can, in fact, help to explain aggregate economic activity.
most recent business cycle). Relative state out-
put growth, y{, the difference between the
growth rate of real GSP and that of real GNP, is
regressed on its own lagged value and on var-
ious lagged measures of state credit conditions.
The first type of model specifies a log-linear
relationship between credit conditions and rela-
tive state output growth of the general form
(i) + e,
i= 1
where all explanatory variables are lagged one
year and CREDIT is the set of proxies for state
credit conditions included in the regression.
The second type of model includes interactive
dummy variables for all explanatory variables to
test whether there is a significantly different rela-
tionship between credit conditions and output in
low-growth versus high-growth states. Regres-





where Ho and Ht are dummy variables that
equal one when yt t is positive, and Do and D(
are dummy variables that equal one when yt,
is strictly negative. This specification effectively
splits the pooled sample into low-growth and
high-growth observations.
The Credit Variables
The credit view suggests that credit flows—while
inherently reflecting expectations about the prof-
itability of current real investment opportunities
—may also be affected by the information costs
associated with supplying external finance. I
have not identified whether agency costs or un-
derlying investment fundamentals drive financial
flows. However, I attempt to control for expecta-
tions about future economic performance by in-
cluding the growth rate of the constant-dollar
volume of bank lending (GLOAN) as a credit
proxy that is relatively forward-looking, as op-
posed to balance-sheet measures that capture the
quality of existing credit. State-level data on the
nominal stock of end-of-year bank loans out-
standing were obtained from the Federal Finan-FIGURE 2
Ratio of Failed Business
Liabilities to GSP (Scaled








1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Ratio
_ South Atlantic
_ East South Central




1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
SOURCES: Dun and Bradstreet Corporation; and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
cial Institutions Examination Council's Reports
of Condition and Income (call reports) and
were deflated by the GSP deflator.
Other financial proxies, more directly related
to the ex post creditworthiness of both bank
and nonbank business borrowers as a result of
past financial decisions, are included in each
specification. I include these proxies to test
whether, when controlling for real loan growth
(expectations about the future) and past relative
output growth, they significantly help to explain
the relative growth of state output.
I use Dun and Bradstreet state-level annual
data on the volume of failed liabilities associated
with business failures to measure the overall
creditworthiness of business borrowers. Busi-
ness failures that occur in a given year are re-
lated to the flow of credit in default; thus, their
numbers are related both to bankruptcy costs
and to changes in the stock of entrepreneurial
capital. The business failure series does not in-
clude firms that voluntarily discontinued opera-
tions with no loss to creditors, but only those
that are legally insolvent.
1
2 A higher level of
business liabilities in default should increase the
cost of credit to entrepreneurs and reduce future
economic activity.
To control for differences in the size of state
economies, the volume of failed business
liabilities was scaled by GSP.
1
3 The log of this
ratio was included in all regressions. Figure 2
illustrates the regional differences in this vari-
able, depicting the ratio of failed business
liabilities to GSP (deflated by the national ratio)
for nine regions. During the 1980s, the volume
of bad credit relative to income increased for
the U.S. economy as a whole. For regions such
as the oil-producing states, however, credit
problems were reflected in a substantially
greater deterioration in business balance sheets.
A regional credit view that emphasizes the
role of banks in funding local projects implies
that bank equity capital reflects bank creditwor-
thiness because it is the buffer between the
performance of bank loan portfolios and insol-
vency. However, bank equity capital is a poor
proxy for bank creditworthiness because, like
capital on any corporate balance sheet, it is not a
market valuation of the present value of firm
ownership. Such a valuation would reflect
expectations about the quality of the current
loan portfolio, including the return on the loan
portfolio, the volume of loans in default, and the
degree of default on bad loans. Instead, the
measures of the creditworthiness of local bank-
ing sectors came from state-level call report data
on loan quality and bank profitability. These
include loan loss reserves, nonperforming loans
(defined as loans 90 days past due and still accru-
ing, plus nonaccruing loans) as a share of total
loans, and the ratio of net income to bank equity
• 12 It should be noted, however, that legal insolvency—the inabil-
ity to service debt liabilities —may reflect balance-sheet J I liquidity rather
than economic insolvency. The inability to obtain credit may reflect expec-
tations about the profitability of future local investment opportunities.
• 13 This ratio measures the flow of bad debt relative to the flow of
income available for debt service.FIGURE 3
Ratio of Nonperforming
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capital. The latter measure — the ex post return
on bank equity (ROE) — is positively related to
bank creditworthiness, as it represents the poten-
tial growth of internally generated bank capital.
1
4
Provisions for loan loss reserves should
reflect assessments of the degree of default on
M 14 In choosing measures of financial distress for a state's banking
sector, obvious choices are data on the number of and liabilities of failed
banks. However, because many failed banks are merged, their balance
sheets are included in call report data. Data on bank failures will be in-
cluded in future extensions of this study.
the current portfolio and thus on the credit
quality of current loans outstanding. Given the
promised yields on existing loans, larger loan
loss reserves correspond to a lower return on
existing assets. Therefore, the growth rate of
loan loss reserves deflated by the GSP deflator
(GLOANLOSS) was included in the regressions
as a proxy for expected default losses on exist-
ing loan portfolios.
Nonperforming loans should reflect the share
of the loan portfolio that is currently in default,
but do not necessarily indicate the degree of
default. Nonperforming loans, like failed busi-
ness liabilities, reflect realizations of credit per-
formance rather than expectations about future
loan performance. The log of the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (SNONPERF)
was included in some specifications as a proxy
for the default rate on bank loans. Unfortunately,
data on nonperforming loans are available only
after 1981, so regressions using this series span
only 1983 to 1986.
These problem-loan variables are important
because they are related to the market values of
both bank assets and bank capital—and hence
to the creditworthiness of banks as borrowers
today. The credit view presented here suggests
that these variables may affect the characteristics
of future credit extended and the use of inter-
mediation technology in making new loans. In
addition, bad loans can also cause banks to
abrogate existing credit relationships; therefore,
banks must expend resources in seeking out
new investment opportunities. The disparities in
bank-credit problems across regions are shown
in figure 3, which depicts the share of nonper-
forming loans to total loans by region, as well
as the national share. Although the national
share was flat over the sample period of 1983 to
1986, there were substantial differences in both
the level and the trend across regions.
III. Empirical
Evidence
Results were derived from pooled regressions
using cross-sectional state data over the sample
period of 1980 to 1986. Regressions including
the nonperforming loan series had a sample
period of 1983 to 1986.
1
5 The variables are
• 15 The pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions were es-
timated using the Shazam statistical package, with the autocorrelation
coefficient, rho, constrained to be zero for all states. Pooled regressions
that did not restrict the autocorrelation coefficient to be zero (but also did
not adjust estimates for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables)
yielded near-zero estimates of rho and no significant difference in the
results.B 0 X 1
Notes on Statistical Tables
a
GSPDIF •. The growth rate of real gross state product minus
the growth rate of real gross national product.
LGSPDIF: GSPDIF'(-1) if GSPDIF'< 0.
HGSPDIF • GSPDIF'(-1) if GSPDIF> 0.
GIOAN: The growth rate of commercial bank loans deflated
by the GSP deflator.
LGLOAN: GLOAN(-l) if GSPDIF< 0.
HGLOAN: GLOAN(-l) if GSPDIF> 0.
FLIAB •. The log of the ratio of failed business liabilities to
GSP.
IFLIAB: FLIAB (-1) if GSPDIF< 0.
HFLIAB • FLIAB (-1) if GSPDIF> 0.
GLOANLOSS: The growth rate of loan loss reserves deflated
by the GSP deflator.
LGLOANLOSS: GLOANLOSS (-1) if GSPDIF< 0.
HGLOANLOSS: GLOANLOSS (-1) if GSPDIF> 0.
The ratio of net income to equity capital of commer-
cial banks.
LROE: ROE{.-X) if GSPDIF< 0.
HROE • ROE(-V) if GSPDIF> 0.
SNONPERF •. The log of the ratio of nonperforming loans to
total loans for commercial banks.
LSNONPERF: SNONPERF'(-I) if GSPDIF< 0.
HSNONPERF: SNONPERF (-1) if GSPDIF > 0.
a. The term (-1) indicates a one-year lag.
defined in box 1. The relative growth rate of
real GSP was regressed on its own lagged value
and on the lagged values of the proxies for state
balance-sheet conditions. To control somewhat
for expectations about the profitability of local
investment opportunities, all regressions in-
clude the lagged value of the growth rate of
bank loans. Also, dummy variables testing for
economywide fixed effects by year were in-
cluded in each regression specification.
Estimates of equation (1) are presented in
panel A of table 1. In these regressions, the rela-
tionship between credit conditions and output is
restricted to be the same for low-growth and
high-growth observations.
Panel B of table 1 presents the results for sym-
metric regressions including interactive dummies
that allow the coefficients on the explanatory
variables to be different for states experiencing
low growth and high growth. These dummies
split the sample and help to determine whether
there is a structurally different relationship
between lagged credit conditions and current
relative output growth for low-growth and high-
growth observations.
In all regressions, the lagged dependent vari-
able explains most of the current relative growth
of state output. Interestingly, controlling for
lagged credit conditions, the relationship is not
significantly different for low-growth versus high-
growth observations in any of the specifications
estimated.
Alternatively, there is a significantly different
relationship between lagged credit conditions
and current relative output growth in every
specification. This indicates that the financial
balance-sheet conditions inherited from the
past are related to real economic activity differ-
ently for states experiencing a relative boom
than for those experiencing relatively low
growth. Thus, comparing the results in panel A
with those in panel B indicates that restricting
the relationship between financial factors and
economic activity to be the same across states
independent of relative conditions — a restric-
tion implicitly imposed in tests using macro-
economic data — may obscure a significant link
between credit and output.
The split sample results yield some evidence
that financial factors matter in a way that is con-
sistent with the credit view discussed here. The
structural differences are in the relationship of
output to the lagged variables that proxy for in-
herited financial balance-sheet conditions.
The ratio of failed business liabilities to state
output is a significant predictor of negative out-
put growth primarily in low-growth states (table
1, specifications 2.A and 2.A'). However, when
nonperforming loans and the return on bank
equity capital are included, this asymmetric rela-
tionship is no longer evident. At the same time,
reverse causality tests (table 2) indicate that there
is a different relationship among failed business
liabilities, the return on bank equity capital, and
nonperforming loans in low- versus high-growth
states. These results suggest that bank credit
quality and bank earnings may reflect the impact
of broader business financial conditions in low-
growth states.
Lagged loan loss reserves are negatively
related to output growth only in low-growth
states. The coefficients on loan loss reserves are
generally insignificant in high-growth states.
This can be interpreted to indicate that past
provisions for loan losses may be constraining
credit availability in states experiencing low rela-
tive growth. Interestingly, reverse causality tests
between loan loss reserves and the return onTABLE 1
Results for Regressions Explaining
Relative State Output Growth—
Dependent Variable: GSPDIF
(1.A) (1.B)
Panel A: Pooled Sample Results


































































































































































































































































































































































a. Coefficient (or sum of coefficients) is significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Coefficient (or sum of coefficients) is significant at the 5 percent level.
c. Slope coefficients are significantly different for GSPDIF< 0 and GSPDIF > 0 at the 1 percent significance level.
d. Slope coefficients are significantly different for GSPDIFK 0 and GSPDIF > 0 at the 5 percent significance level.
NOTE: T-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is indicated by the year dummies. The means of the dependent variable are .003 and
-.002 for the sample periods 1980-86 and 1983^-86, respectively.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.TABLE 2
Reverse Causality Tests
for Credit Variables



























































































































































































































































































a. Coefficient (or sum of coefficients) is significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Coefficient (or sum of coefficients) is significant at the 5 percent level.
c. Slope coefficients are significantly different for GSPD/F< 0 and GSPDIF > 0 at the 1 percent significance level.
d. Slope coefficients are significantly different for GSPDIF< 0 and GSPDIF > 0 at the 5 percent significance level.
NOTE: ^-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is indicated by the year dummies.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
bank equity capital (table 2) yield evidence that
banks in high-growth states may be using loan
loss reserves to smooth income. These results
are consistent with the notion that financial
capacity is more important for ailing economies
than for healthy ones.
A somewhat puzzling result is that, in the
regressions that exclude nonperforming loans,
the lagged return on bank equity capital is posi-
tively related to output growth in high-growth
states, but negatively related to output growth
in low-growth states. The credit-health view
implies that if the return on bank capital merely
captures the potential flow of internally gener-
ated funds and hence increased financial capac-
ity, it should be positively related to local relative
growth. Alternatively, there is evidence that the
negative relationship between bank profitability
and output may be capturing tighter lending
practices by loan officers. Thus, the asymmetrybetween low- and high-growth states is consis-
tent with the notion that creditworthiness may af-
fect credit availability and economic activity.
1
6
When nonperforming loans are included (table
1, specification 2.D), the lagged return on equity
is no longer significantly related to output
growth for either group. In addition, reverse
causality tests (table 2, specification 6.A) yield
evidence in favor of the tighter-lending interpre-
tation of the asymmetry; in states experiencing
low growth, the lagged return on equity is posi-
tively related to the share of nonperforming
loans, while this credit-quality variable nega-
tively impacts future profitability.
Finally, although lagged loan growth is sig-
nificantly related to relative output growth in
the pooled sample regressions (table 1, panel
A), the split sample regressions (table 1, panel
B) yield little evidence that real loan growth is
positively related to output growth when state
financial balance-sheet conditions are included
as explanatory variables.
These results are not meant to be interpreted
as identifying the exact nature or magnitude of a
regional credit channel. As with all tests of
whether financial variables cause real variables,
the fact that lagged financial variables "Granger
cause" economic activity does not mean that in-
herently forward-looking financial decisions do
not reflect expectations about future economic
conditions. Thus, decisions to extend credit as
well as to default or to mark down the valuation
of bank assets reflect, to some degree, the
present valuation of the expected payoff on
financial claims as related to expectations about
future economic conditions. The evidence that
financial factors may exacerbate output fluctua-
tions is the significantly different relationship be-
tween inherited credit conditions and economic
performance in healthy regions versus those
experiencing poor relative economic growth.
IV. Conclusion
Current concerns about financial-market fragil-
ity are forcing policymakers to face the issue of
whether monetary policy should be used to con-
front credit-quality problems in the financial sec-
tor. However, opinions and interpretations
differ on what the evidence of a credit channel
implies for policymakers. The regional dimen-
sion of current financial conditions further com-
plicates the problem, because its solution
• 16 In addition, states with a lower capital-to-asset ratio (ant) hence
lower bank creditworthiness) will have higher returns on equity, all else
being equal.
depends on what is causing credit markets to be
regional, as well as on the sources of regional
credit disparities.
This paper presents evidence that regional
economic performance is related to regional
creditworthiness. State financial balance-sheet
conditions, inherited from the past, have a sig-
nificant relationship to current state output
growth for states that are experiencing low rela-
tive growth; the relationship is consistent with
the credit-health view and is significantly dif-
ferent from the relationship in states experienc-
ing high growth. The empirical tests presented
here, however, are a joint test of whether bank-
ing markets are regional and whether there is a
credit link between these markets and the rela-
tive performance of state economies. Thus, the
implications of these results for policymakers
depend on why credit markets are regional.
The model of regional credit markets dis-
cussed here captures some of the features of
banking in an economy that is regional because
of information costs. To the extent that entre-
preneurs must rely on regional credit markets to
originate specialized investments, the health of
these borrowers and of the local banking sector
that provides intermediation services can affect
regional economic activity when there is asym-
metric information between borrowers and in-
vestors supplying external finance.
The regional nature of U.S. credit markets may
also be a reflection of the historically unique
regulatory structure of the banking industry. Reg-
ulations, such as interstate branching restrictions,
limit the ability of banks to diversify across
regions. If credit markets are regional because
regulations are binding, then the benefits of reg-
ulation should be weighed against the costs of
less diversification. When it is costly to monitor
borrowers — whether financial or nonfinancial
— the ability to diversify is related to the ability
to avoid bad outcomes that can make it more
costly to obtain credit in the future. Likewise,
limits on the scale of banks that impede their
ability to raise capital may exacerbate regional
output fluctuations, as poor bank profitability
may constrain future lending when local real
economic conditions improve.
Because the regional dimensions of credit
markets in an economy that is inherently
regional are not likely to be merely artifacts of
regulatory policies, the implications of a
regional credit view for the conduct of stabiliza-
tion policy will not disappear with deregulation.
Thus, even in a deregulated environment, it is
likely that financial flows will be sensitive to the
health of regional entrepreneurs to the degreethat these borrowers write contracts that are not
fully contingent on the random return on their
investments. But the credit view recognizes that
this financial structure may also be the most effi-
cient way of dealing with information costs in-
herent in financial contracts. Currently, we do
not observe large banks divesting themselves of
what can be defined as "aggregate risks." This
may be the result of disincentives in the current
regulatory environment. Alternatively, bank con-
tracting may reflect the highly specialized char-
acteristics of bank investments that make these
risks difficult to assess, but at the same time may
reflect one reason that financial intermediaries
exist: to fund portfolios of specialized invest-
ment opportunities (Fama [1980, 1985]).
To the extent that information costs make
financial markets inherently regional, financial
conditions may be an unavoidable propagation
mechanism to relative regional performance. In
this scenario, it is hard to argue from a pure ef-
ficiency criterion that policymakers should "do
anything" in response to a regional credit im-
balance, such as that plaguing New England,
because the malaise may be an unavoidable out-
come of the market mechanism, however infor-
mation intensive. General stabilization policies
aimed at alleviating a regional credit problem
are likely to have redistributional effects that are
not justifiable according to a pure efficiency
standard. Indeed, an expectation of this policy
response — to the extent that it amounts to a
monetary bailout — may distort the incentives
to diversify ex ante and may exacerbate the
potential problem.
In assessing the policy implications of the
events of the past decade, it is therefore impor-
tant to distinguish between microeconomic pol-
icies affecting financial market structure and
macroeconomic policies aimed at promoting
economic stability and growth. The interdepen-
dence of structural policies and stabilization pol-
icies allows the distinction to be easily blurred.
The unfortunate outcome is often that macro-
economic tools are used to try to remedy the ills
that result from microeconomic banking regula-
tions and structural changes in the financial sec-
tor. If the current regional financial crisis is to
some degree the result of regulatory policies,
then the crisis represents an opportunity to fos-
ter a sentiment for regulatory change. To use
regional financial fragility as a rationale for a
general macroeconomic easing without address-
ing whether regulatory policies are part of the
problem may mean losing an opportunity for
structural reform that could ameliorate the prob-
lem in the long run.
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